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In Re Herbert B.: RESTITUTION 
IN JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS 
In the case of In Re Herbert B., 303 Md. 
419, 494 A.2d 680 (1985), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to 
consider whether a judgment of restitution 
was proper for damages caused by a juve-
nile even though the court found as a mat-
ter of fact that the juvenile was not a de-
linquent and dismissed the matter. 
In 1982, a laundromat located in Prince 
George's County was broken into and cer-
tain property damaged. The appellant, 
sixteen-year-old Herbert B., was appre-
hended. At an adjudicatory hearing con-
ducted by the Circuit Court for Prince 
George's County, sitting as a juvenile 
court, appellant was found to have been in-
volved in storehouse breaking, petty theft, 
and destruction of private property. The 
court ordered an investigation and report 
to be completed by the Juvenile Services 
Administration, imposed court costs, and 
ordered a restitution hearing. 
A restitution hearing was held and resti-
tution in the amount of $228.50 was rec-
ommended. Later, at a disposition hearing, 
the court determined as a matter of fact 
that despite the commission of a delinquent 
act, appellant was not a delinquent child 
and therefore was not in need of treatment 
or guidance and the matter was dismissed. 
Nevertheless, the court directed appellant 
and his mother to pay $228.50 restitution 
to the owner of the laundromat. 
The issue raised on appeal was whether 
a court could enter a judgment of restitu-
tion after a case had been dismissed. The 
court of special appeals held that MD. 
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. 
§ 3-829(a) (1984) established the necess~ry 
criteria for a judgment of restitution: first, 
that the child committed a delinquent act; 
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secondly, that the property of another was 
destroyed, stolen or damaged. Because the 
appellant satisfied these criteria, the court 
of special appeals affirmed the lower court's 
decision. See, In Re Herbert B., 58 Md. 
App. 24, 472 A.2d 95 (1984). 
Similarly, the court of appeals rejected 
appellant's argument and held that, al-
though the lower court decided that the 
child was not delinquent and that "the 
matter will stand dismissed," this was 
meant as an indication for the record that 
the child was not delinquent. Thus, the 
court was not acting upon the petition it-
self but merely determining the underly-
ing issue in the dispositional hearing. 
Additionally, appellant argued that the 
court at the dispositional hearing had to 
find him a "delinquent child" before it 
could enter a judgment of restitution un-
der Section 3-829(a). MD. CTS. & JUD. 
PROC. CODE ANN. (1984). The court 
rejected this contention citing section 
3-829(a). The court stated that the plain 
language of section 3-829(a) clearly did 
not require that a child be adjudicated a 
delinquent as a prerequisite for ordering 
restitution. Furthermore, section 3-829( e) 
states that a restitution hearing may be 
held "as part of" or "contemporaneously 
with" either the adjudicatory or disposi-
tional hearing. See, In Re Dan D., 57 Md. 
App. 522, 528, 470 A.2d 1318, 1321 
(1984). The court in an adjudicatory hear-
ing does not sit to determine whether a 
child is delinquent or not. Rather, the pri-
mary purpose of this particular hearing is 
to hear the merits of the allegations in 
the petition. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
CODE ANN. § 3-80l(b)(1984); See, InRe 
Ernest J., 52 Md. App, 56,60,447 A.2d 
97, 100 (1982). In other words, an adjudi-
catory hearing is to determine whether the 
child committed the delinquent act alleged. 
If the court determines that the child com-
mitted the delinquent act, a separate dis-
position hearing is conducted. MD. CTS. 
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-820(a) 
(1984). Clearly, Maryland law allows entry 
of a judgment of restitution at an adjudica-
tory hearing. Moreover, there is no statu-
tory requisite that a child be adjudged a de-
linquent prior to ordering restitution. 
Here, at the adjudicatory hearing, the 
court found that appellant had committed 
a delinquent act. At the dispositional hear-
ing, the court found that appellant was not 
a delinquent child. However, since appel-
lant was found to have committed a delin-
quent act during which he stole, damaged 
and destroyed the property of another, the 
court properly ordered restitution. 
-Marilys Fernandez 
City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne 
Living Center, Inc.: THE COURT 
REJECTS MENTAL RETARDATION 
AS A SUSPECT CLASS 
In City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne 
Living Center, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 3249 (1985), 
the Supreme Court of the United States re-
cently held that mental retardation is not a 
quasi-suspect classification for equal pro-
tection clause purposes, and thus the Con-
stitution requires only that legislation re-
lating to this classification be rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest. Men-
tally retarded persons, because of their 
reduced capacity to function in the every-
day world, differ from other persons, and 
the states' interests in dealing with them 
and providing for them are clearly legiti-
mate ones. The Court reasoned that the 
mere "rational basis" standard of judicial 
review affords government the necessary 
latitude to both pursue policies which 
assist the retarded, and to engage in activi-
ties which burden them in an incidental 
manner. 
In July, 1980, Jan Hannah, Vice Presi-
dent and part owner of Cleburne Living 
Centers, Inc. (CLC), purchased a home 
with the intention ofleasing it to CLC. It 
was anticipated that the building would 
house 13 retarded men and women under 
the constant supervision of the CLC staff. 
The city informed CLC that a special use 
permit was required for the construction 
of"[h]ospitals for the feebleminded", and 
that the group home proposed by CLC 
should be classified as such an institution. 
After holding a public hearing on CLC's 
application, the City Council voted to 
deny the special use permit. 
CLC then filed suit in federal district 
court alleging that the zoning ordinance 
was invalid on its face and as applied be-
cause it discriminated against the mentally 
retarded in violation of the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
The district court, while finding that the 
city council decision was motivated pri-
marily by the fact that the residents of the 
home would be mentally retarded, held 
the ordinance constitutional both as writ-
ten and as applied. Upon concluding that 
no fundamental right was implicated, and 
that mental retardation was neither a sus-
pect nor quasi-suspect classification, the 
court applied the "rational basis" standard 
of review. The ordinance was found to be 
rationally related to the city's interest in 
the legal responsibility of CLC, the safety 
and fears of the neighborhood residents, 
and the number of residents within a home. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that mental retarda-
tion was a quasi-suspect classification, and 
that the ordinance should be assessed un-
der intermediate level scrutiny. City of 
Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 
Inc., 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984). The 
fifth circuit, in recognizing that mental re-
tardation is relevant to many legislative ac-
tions, concluded that strict scrutiny was 
not appropriate. However, the court also 
concluded that the mentally retarded have 
suffered from a history of mistreatment 
which they have been politically powerless 
to combat. This, and other factors, led the 
court to hold the ordinance facially invalid 
because it did not further any important 
government interest. The court also went 
on to hold the ordinance invalid as applied. 
In its majority opinion, the Supreme 
Court, after a brief review of the back-
ground of equal protection analysis, held 
that the court of appeals erred in holding 
mental retardation a quasi-suspect classifi-
cation. First, the Court reasoned that the 
judiciary is not properly suited to substan-
tively judge legislative decisions concern-
ing a group as large and diverse as the men-
tally retarded. Second, the Court found 
that the mentally retarded have not been 
subjected to a history of discrimination; by 
reviewing Federal and Texas legislation 
concerning the retarded, the Court con-
cluded that the nature of existing legisla-
tion was indicative of society's intent to 
assist the retarded and to provide for their 
needs in a rational manner. Third, the 
Court considered the existence of the ordi-
nance itself inconsistent with the fifth cir-
cuit's reasoning that the retarded are po-
litically powerless, and fourth, the Court 
declined from setting a precedent which 
would distinguish the retarded from any 
other group with immutable characteristics 
which had failed to illicit its desired legis-
lative responses. By refraining from invok-
ing quasi-suspect status upon the mentally 
retarded, the Court indicated a belief that 
government should be free to pursue poli-
cies which assist the retarded, and to en-
gage in activities which burden them in an 
incidental manner. Government need only 
act in a manner which is neither arbitrary 
nor capricious. 
The Court reserved the issue of zoning 
ordinance's facial validity, and addressed 
the manner in which it was applied in this 
case using the rational basis standard. The 
Court found that the city council's denial 
of the special permit based on the legal 
responsibility ofCLC, the interests of the 
neighborhood residents, and the number 
of individuals living in a home was not 
rational in light of the fact that the CLC 
residents differed from other residents of 
similar group houses only in their mental 
retardation. This difference, in turn, posed 
no special threat to the city's legitimate in-
terests, and was therefore an unjustified 
discriminatory practice. 
There were two separate opinions in 
City of Cleburne in addition to the majority 
opinion. Justices Stevens and Burger, 
while concurring in the Court's judgment, 
declined to accept the traditional tiered 
equal protection analysis in this case. 
Tiered analysis, according to Stevens, is 
an overly regimented way of explaining a 
single principle. The Court should, in 
Stevens' view, perform equal protection 
analysis on a case by case basis, applying 
the factors repeatedly emphasized by the 
Court, such as political powerlessness, and 
a history of purposeful discrimination. 
Justice Marshall, with whom Justices 
Brennan and Blackmun joined, also con-
curred in the judgment, but disagreed 
with the majority's avoidance of the broad 
constitutional issue of whether the ordi-
nance was facially invalid. Justice Marshall 
would have applied a more exacting level 
of scrutiny, and held the ordinance facially 
invalid as had the court of appeals. 
- John D. Warfield 
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